24 October 1990*, Pb 1193

Politburo. Report about the founding congress of the “Democratic Russia” movement and its anti-Communist stance (7 pp). [R 24 Oct 90, 7 pp – Pb 1193] Excerpt.

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[page one of seven]

No Pb 1193
24 October 1990

To Members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo,
Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee,
members of the USSR President’s council, plus Comrades Pugo and Orlov

Information from Comrade Polozkov about the founding congress
of the Democratic Russia movement (20-21 October 1990)

Print 60 copies

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[Page two]

Return to the CPSU Central Committee (General Department, 1st sector)
PB-1193 [vertical text on left margin – Return within 15 days]

Sent to Politburo members, Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee
and members of the USSR President’s council

To the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee

The congress was attended by 1,270 delegates from 73 regions and autonomous republics, representatives of parties, non-governmental organisations and movements opposed to the CPSU: the Democratic Party of Russia, the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, the Democratic Platform, the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Peasants’ Party of Russia, the Party of Free Labour, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, April [writer’s organisation], the Conference of Labour, Memorial, the Association of Leaseholders, the Young Russia organisation, Shield [army organisation] and others.

Twenty-three USSR People’s Deputies, 104 RSFSR People’s Deputies, deputies from Mossoviet and Lensoviet and other local soviets took part in the work of the Congress. More than 200 guests were invited to the congress from the union republics, and also from the USA, Britain, FRG, France, Japan, Poland and the Czechoslovak Republic. The work of the congress was covered by about 300 Soviet and foreign correspondents.

The main attention of the congress was on the organisational strengthening of the democratic movement in its struggle against “the monopoly of the CPSU on power”, the creation of an information network of democratic forces and their political infrastructure, the activisation of the masses and the holding of joint protests with other opposition movements.

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[page three]

The organising centre of all the work of the founding congress of the Democratic Russia movement were the USSR People’s Deputies Yu. Afanasyev and A. Murashov, and the RSFSR People’s Deputies V. Dmitriev, V. Lysenko and L. Ponomaryov.

The discussion was chaotic, anti-democratic and the established procedures were [often] infringed. The distinguishing feature of the congress was its rabid anti-communism. Strategy and tactics were developed for removing the CPSU from the political arena and the dismantling of the existing State and political system. […]

The congress exposed the contradictory nature of the movement. From the very beginning a difference was revealed between representatives of the parties taking part in the work of the congress. These differences and contradictions did not extend beyond the limits of the anti-communist platform that united them all, and mainly concerned personal ambitions and claims to leadership. […]

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[page four]

[…] There were unbridled attacks at the congress on the USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A.I. Lukyanov, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov, the chairman of the USSR KGB V.A. Kryuchkov and the USSR Minister of Defence D.T. Yazov

[…] The harsh and uncompromising tone of the documents adopted by the congress is noteworthy. In essence, all of them are a call for confrontation, civil disobedience and a further destabilisation of the situation within the country.

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[page five]

An analysis of the documents adopted by the founding congress, the nature of the speeches, the entire atmosphere of the congress and campaign that led up to its opening provide irrefutable evidence that a united bloc of antisocialist, anticommunist forces has been created to undermine the socio-political foundations of the country, seize power and remove the CPSU from the political arena. […]

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[page seven]

Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party

I. Polozkov

Print 60 copies

24 October 1990

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NOTES
General
1. Notes by translator and editor are bracketed, thus [ ];
2. text written by hand is indicated in italic script;
3. when a handwritten phrase, figure or word has been added
to a previously typed document this is indicated by underlined italic script.
Tr. JC
Posted in 1. CPSU, Ideology & Politics, 4. Perestroika

28 September 1990*, 06/2-439

Central Committee. Periodic threat that the East German Party archives will be seized by the FRG authorities; the response of the CPSU, September 1990 to March 1991 (7 pp). [R 28 Sep 90, No 06-2-439] Excerpt.

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[page one of seven]

Send to Politburo members
and Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee for voting

 October 1990

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[page two]

Secret

To the CPSU Central Committee

In accordance with instructions (Pb 2/III) we present
a revised draft of the Resolution.

Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

[signed] V. Falin

28 September 1990

No 6/2-439

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[page three]

Top Secret
Draft

RESOLUTION OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

On measures in response to the persecution
of the Party of Democratic Socialism (GDR)

1. Acknowledge the expediency of an appeal by the USSR President M.S. Gorbachev to the FRG Chancellor H. Kohl.

1. 2.  In implementation of the resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress the Ideological and International Departements of the CPSU Central Committee are to organise the systematic publication of reports in the Party press and other mass media about incidents of harassment and persecution of former SED members, their dismissal from their jobs for political motives, classifying such acts as a violation of the principles of democracy and human rights.

Particular attention must be paid to charges of “treason” being brought against individuals who were employed by the State in the GDR or engaged in Party work, especially as concerns their cooperation with the USSR.

2 3. In reports about the course of German reunification due attention must be paid to the activities of the PDS. React to attempts to infringe the constitutional rights of the Party and deprive it of its lawfully owned property.

The Central Committee International Department should ensure it regularly receives information from the PDS about cases of harassment of Party members, and also of publications that reveal the anti-socialist nature of the measures carried out by the West German side during the course of reunification.

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[page four]

3 4. Constantly monitor and respond promptly to attempts to exacerbate tensions around the Western Forces Group, sowing a hostile attitude to Soviet people.

4 5. Provide for the possible evacuation to the USSR of persons who cooperated closely with Soviet organisations and have now become the object of harassment and persecution on the part of Bonn. This could apply, before all else, to Party workers, the security services and the GDR National People’s Army, cultural, scientific and academic figures, experienced factory managers who have lost their jobs due to political repression in the united Germany. Take the necessary measures to find them work and provide for their material well-being.

6. The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee is to inform the PDS leadership about the measures taken as part of this Resolution.

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

18 October 1990

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[page five]

Top Secret

TO THE DEPUTY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Comrade V.A. Ivashko

Dear Vladimir Antonovich

On the instructions of V.M. Falin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, I am reporting:

1. When I was on business in the FRG from 7 to 12 March this year, I met with Comrade Gysi, the chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). He requested that I privately communicate the following to the leadership of the CPSU. In the next few days the Federal government intends to put a draft law before the Bundestag proposing the confiscation from the PDS of the archives of the former state security services and their transfer to the State. In anticipation of the Bundestag decision, which is certain to approve the aforementioned draft law, the archives have already been sequestrated.

The archives contain a great many secret documents and their publication would lead to the most undesirable consequences, not only for the PDS but also for the CPSU. In particular, this concerns: detailed minutes of almost all meetings and conversations between the leaders of the SED and of other communist and workers’ parties, beginning with the CPSU; documents concerning the activities of illegal communist parties that received material support from the German government security service (with our agreement); reports on the financial aid provided by the SED to progressive organisations in the FRG before German reunification, and so on.

In Gysi’s words public access to the documents in the archive would be a ‘genuine catastrophe’. The PDS chairman urgently requests the Soviet leadership ‘while there is still time’, to bring influence to bear on Chancellor Kohl, and get him either to release the SED archive, i.e. return it to its lawful owner, the PDS, or if the Chancellor considers that impossible, to destroy the archive.

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[page six]

This is the second time that Comrade Gysi has raised this issue. At the beginning of this year on the personal orders of Comrade M.S. Gorbachev the Soviet embassy in the FRG made a confidential appeal to the administration of the Federal Chancellor but without success. Gysi believes that the only solution is to include the matter in the next high-level telephone conversation between Moscow and Bonn. (Perhaps it would make sense to raise the matter in conversation with Comrade M.S. Gorbachev during the course of the visit to Moscow on 18 March of FRG Foreign Minister H-D. Genscher.)

2. At the beginning of March this year the Department was visited by Markus Wolf, the former head of the GDR foreign intelligence service (the former first directorate of the State Security Service of the GDR). In conversation with Comrade Falin, Wolf reported that “dark clouds were gathering over his head”. Under pressure from the right wing of the ruling coalition, the German leadership was not abandoning its intention of bringing criminal charges against him.

This was unlawful since, having recognised in 1973 the sovereignty of the GDR, the leadership of the FRG thereby recognised that it was entitled to all State functions including, naturally, the pursuit of intelligence activities. Therefore, the regular employees of the former GDR intelligence service could not be subject to judicial prosecution, if they had not committee criminal offences, and in Wolf’s case that was indisputably so. Whatever accusations might be made against the former GDR Ministry of State Security [Stasi], they could not be extended to the regular staff of the intelligence service which operated within its framework. You might just as well make a similar accusation against staff of the [West German] BND for their activities  on East German territory, Wolf suggested. […]

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[page seven]

[signed] N. Portugalov

International Department of the CPSU Central Committee

13 March 1991

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General
1. Notes by translator and editor are bracketed, thus [ ];
2. text written by hand is indicated in italic script;
3. when a handwritten phrase, figure or word has been added
to a previously typed document this is indicated by underlined italic script.
Translation, JC
Posted in 4. Perestroika, 5. CPSU & Communist world

14 February 1990*, St-112/27

Secretariat Resolution. Meet in part requests from the Argentinean and Chilean Communist Parties: “special training” for Argentina, 5 people; and Chile, 4 people (9 pp). [R 14 Feb 90, St 112-27] Excerpt.

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[page one of nine]

No St 112/27, 14 February 1990

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

RESOLUTION
of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee

1. The requests by leaders of the Communist Parties of Argentina (CPA) and Chile (CPC) shall be partially satisfied and five representatives of the CPA and four of the CPC shall be received in the USSR for up to three months in 1990 for training in security protection of the party and its leaders, including with equipment.

2. The International Department and the Administration Department of the CPSU Central Committee are tasked with receiving and looking after the above-mentioned comrades. The USSR State Security Committee is tasked with their training and support in working with documents and special equipment.

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[page two]

3. Travel expenses for representatives of the CPA and the CPC from their country of residence to Moscow and back to the place of destination, including by foreign airlines, as well as their accommodation in the USSR for up to three months, special equipment, and other costs related to fulfilling the requests of leaders of these parties, shall be charged to the budget reserve of the party.

[pages four to nine – Excerpt from Secretariat minutes, report from International Department, handwritten transcripts of conversations with two Party leaders]

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NOTES
General
1. Notes by translator and editor are bracketed, thus [ ];
2. text written by hand is indicated in italic script;
3. when a handwritten phrase, figure or word has been added
to a previously typed document this is indicated by underlined italic script.
Translation, GS
Posted in 7.4 in Latin America | Tagged

10 March 1983* (Pb §6)

Politburo meeting. Andropov chairs discussion about the situation in Afghanistan and a possible Soviet withdrawal. [R 10 April 1983, Politburo, para 1]

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[page one of four]

Top Secret
Single Copy
(Draft Minutes)

MEETING OF CPSU POLITBURO
18 January 1983

chaired by
Comrade Yu.V. ANDROPOV

Comrades in attendance:
G.A.Aliev, M.S. Gorbachev, A.A.Gromyko,
A.L. Pelshe,  A.A. Tikhonov, K.U. Chernenko,
P.N. Demichev, V.I. Dolgikh, V.V. Kuznetsov,
M.S. Solomentsev, I.V. Kapitonov, N.I. Ryzhkov

1. Summary of talks with Samora Machel, Chairman of the Frelimo Party, President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique

[…]


[page two]

12.

6. The situation in Afghanistan and additional measures for its improvement

GROMYKO. In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo, a group of high-ranking Party, Soviet, military and production management officials travelled to Afghanistan. This group put in some good work there. …

On the whole, the situation in Afghanistan is, as you know, difficult. Lately, certain elements of consolidation have been examined, but the process of consolidation is moving slowly. The number of gangs [rebel groups] is not decreasing. The enemy is not laying down its weapons. The negotiations with Pakistan in Geneva are moving slowly and with difficulty. This is why we must do everything to find a mutually acceptable political settlement. In advance, it can already be said that this process will be a lengthy one. There are questions which must be discussed separately. One should only keep in mind that for now we cannot agree with Pakistan on a specific schedule for the withdrawal of our troops from the country. We must exercise caution here. Yes, the situation is stabilizing. It is good that the Afghan army has grown to 140,000. But the main trouble is that the central authorities have not yet reached the countryside: [they] rarely interact with the masses, about one third of the districts is not under the control of the central authority, and one can feel the fragility of the state government.

… evidently we need to take the steps outlined in the recommendations given to you for examination. It will be necessary to hold a meeting with Karmal and a group of leading officials of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan sometime in April. It seems that it would also be expedient for Yu. V. Andropov to meet personally with Babrak Karmal. …


[page three]

13.

ANDROPOV. You remember how arduously and cautiously we decided the question of deploying troops in Afghanistan. L.I. Brezhnev insisted on a roll call vote by the members of the Politburo. The question was examined at the Plenum of the Central Committee.

In deciding the Afghan problem we must proceed from existing realities. What do you want? This is a feudal country where tribes have always been in charge of their territories, and the central authority was far from always able to reach each kishlak [Afghan settlement]. The problem is not in Pakistan’s position. We are fighting against American imperialism which well understands that in this part of international politics it has lost its positions. That is why we cannot back off.

Miracles don’t happen. Sometimes we are angry at the Afghans because they act illogically and work slowly. But let us remember our fight with the basmachi [resistance to Soviet regime, tr]. Why, back then, almost the entire Red Army was concentrated in Central Asia, yet the fight with the basmachi continued up until the mid-1930’s. And so in our relations with Afghanistan there must be both demands and understanding.

As concerns the recommendations of the Commission, they are a little demanding, perhaps, with exact instructions as to what the Afghan side and what we should do.

GROMYKO. Of course we will work to complete the recommendations.

ANDROPOV. Yes, it should be a political document. It must be much more flexible.

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NOTES
General
1. Notes by translator and editor are bracketed, thus [ ];
2. text written by hand is indicated in italic script;
3. when a handwritten phrase, figure or word has been added
to a previously typed document this is indicated by underlined italic script.
Translation, JC

 

Posted in 9.2 Afghanistan | Tagged