28 September 1990*, 06/2-439

Central Committee. Periodic threat that the East German Party archives will be seized by the FRG authorities; the response of the CPSU, September 1990 to March 1991 (7 pp). [R 28 Sep 90, No 06-2-439] Excerpt.


[page one of seven]

Send to Politburo members
and Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee for voting

 October 1990


[page two]


To the CPSU Central Committee

In accordance with instructions (Pb 2/III) we present
a revised draft of the Resolution.

Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

[signed] V. Falin

28 September 1990

No 6/2-439


[page three]

Top Secret


On measures in response to the persecution
of the Party of Democratic Socialism (GDR)

1. Acknowledge the expediency of an appeal by the USSR President M.S. Gorbachev to the FRG Chancellor H. Kohl.

1. 2.  In implementation of the resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress the Ideological and International Departements of the CPSU Central Committee are to organise the systematic publication of reports in the Party press and other mass media about incidents of harassment and persecution of former SED members, their dismissal from their jobs for political motives, classifying such acts as a violation of the principles of democracy and human rights.

Particular attention must be paid to charges of “treason” being brought against individuals who were employed by the State in the GDR or engaged in Party work, especially as concerns their cooperation with the USSR.

2 3. In reports about the course of German reunification due attention must be paid to the activities of the PDS. React to attempts to infringe the constitutional rights of the Party and deprive it of its lawfully owned property.

The Central Committee International Department should ensure it regularly receives information from the PDS about cases of harassment of Party members, and also of publications that reveal the anti-socialist nature of the measures carried out by the West German side during the course of reunification.


[page four]

3 4. Constantly monitor and respond promptly to attempts to exacerbate tensions around the Western Forces Group, sowing a hostile attitude to Soviet people.

4 5. Provide for the possible evacuation to the USSR of persons who cooperated closely with Soviet organisations and have now become the object of harassment and persecution on the part of Bonn. This could apply, before all else, to Party workers, the security services and the GDR National People’s Army, cultural, scientific and academic figures, experienced factory managers who have lost their jobs due to political repression in the united Germany. Take the necessary measures to find them work and provide for their material well-being.

6. The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee is to inform the PDS leadership about the measures taken as part of this Resolution.


18 October 1990


[page five]

Top Secret


Comrade V.A. Ivashko

Dear Vladimir Antonovich

On the instructions of V.M. Falin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, I am reporting:

1. When I was on business in the FRG from 7 to 12 March this year, I met with Comrade Gysi, the chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). He requested that I privately communicate the following to the leadership of the CPSU. In the next few days the Federal government intends to put a draft law before the Bundestag proposing the confiscation from the PDS of the archives of the former state security services and their transfer to the State. In anticipation of the Bundestag decision, which is certain to approve the aforementioned draft law, the archives have already been sequestrated.

The archives contain a great many secret documents and their publication would lead to the most undesirable consequences, not only for the PDS but also for the CPSU. In particular, this concerns: detailed minutes of almost all meetings and conversations between the leaders of the SED and of other communist and workers’ parties, beginning with the CPSU; documents concerning the activities of illegal communist parties that received material support from the German government security service (with our agreement); reports on the financial aid provided by the SED to progressive organisations in the FRG before German reunification, and so on.

In Gysi’s words public access to the documents in the archive would be a ‘genuine catastrophe’. The PDS chairman urgently requests the Soviet leadership ‘while there is still time’, to bring influence to bear on Chancellor Kohl, and get him either to release the SED archive, i.e. return it to its lawful owner, the PDS, or if the Chancellor considers that impossible, to destroy the archive.


[page six]

This is the second time that Comrade Gysi has raised this issue. At the beginning of this year on the personal orders of Comrade M.S. Gorbachev the Soviet embassy in the FRG made a confidential appeal to the administration of the Federal Chancellor but without success. Gysi believes that the only solution is to include the matter in the next high-level telephone conversation between Moscow and Bonn. (Perhaps it would make sense to raise the matter in conversation with Comrade M.S. Gorbachev during the course of the visit to Moscow on 18 March of FRG Foreign Minister H-D. Genscher.)

2. At the beginning of March this year the Department was visited by Markus Wolf, the former head of the GDR foreign intelligence service (the former first directorate of the State Security Service of the GDR). In conversation with Comrade Falin, Wolf reported that “dark clouds were gathering over his head”. Under pressure from the right wing of the ruling coalition, the German leadership was not abandoning its intention of bringing criminal charges against him.

This was unlawful since, having recognised in 1973 the sovereignty of the GDR, the leadership of the FRG thereby recognised that it was entitled to all State functions including, naturally, the pursuit of intelligence activities. Therefore, the regular employees of the former GDR intelligence service could not be subject to judicial prosecution, if they had not committee criminal offences, and in Wolf’s case that was indisputably so. Whatever accusations might be made against the former GDR Ministry of State Security [Stasi], they could not be extended to the regular staff of the intelligence service which operated within its framework. You might just as well make a similar accusation against staff of the [West German] BND for their activities  on East German territory, Wolf suggested. […]


[page seven]

[signed] N. Portugalov

International Department of the CPSU Central Committee

13 March 1991


1. Notes by translator and editor are bracketed, thus [ ];
2. text written by hand is indicated in italic script;
3. when a handwritten phrase, figure or word has been added
to a previously typed document this is indicated by underlined italic script.
Translation, JC
Posted in 4. Perestroika, 5. CPSU & Communist world

14 February 1990*, St-112/27

Secretariat Resolution. Meet in part requests from the Argentinean and Chilean Communist Parties: “special training” for Argentina, 5 people; and Chile, 4 people (9 pp). [R 14 Feb 90, St 112-27] Excerpt.


[page one of nine]

No St 112/27, 14 February 1990

Top Secret

of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee

1. The requests by leaders of the Communist Parties of Argentina (CPA) and Chile (CPC) shall be partially satisfied and five representatives of the CPA and four of the CPC shall be received in the USSR for up to three months in 1990 for training in security protection of the party and its leaders, including with equipment.

2. The International Department and the Administration Department of the CPSU Central Committee are tasked with receiving and looking after the above-mentioned comrades. The USSR State Security Committee is tasked with their training and support in working with documents and special equipment.


[page two]

3. Travel expenses for representatives of the CPA and the CPC from their country of residence to Moscow and back to the place of destination, including by foreign airlines, as well as their accommodation in the USSR for up to three months, special equipment, and other costs related to fulfilling the requests of leaders of these parties, shall be charged to the budget reserve of the party.

[pages four to nine – Excerpt from Secretariat minutes, report from International Department, handwritten transcripts of conversations with two Party leaders]


1. Notes by translator and editor are bracketed, thus [ ];
2. text written by hand is indicated in italic script;
3. when a handwritten phrase, figure or word has been added
to a previously typed document this is indicated by underlined italic script.
Translation, GS
Posted in 7.4 in Latin America | Tagged

10 March 1983* (Pb §6)

Politburo meeting. Andropov chairs discussion about the situation in Afghanistan and a possible Soviet withdrawal. [R 10 April 1983, Politburo, para 1]


[page one of four]

Top Secret
Single Copy
(Draft Minutes)

18 January 1983

chaired by
Comrade Yu.V. ANDROPOV

Comrades in attendance:
G.A.Aliev, M.S. Gorbachev, A.A.Gromyko,
A.L. Pelshe,  A.A. Tikhonov, K.U. Chernenko,
P.N. Demichev, V.I. Dolgikh, V.V. Kuznetsov,
M.S. Solomentsev, I.V. Kapitonov, N.I. Ryzhkov

1. Summary of talks with Samora Machel, Chairman of the Frelimo Party, President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique


[page two]


6. The situation in Afghanistan and additional measures for its improvement

GROMYKO. In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo, a group of high-ranking Party, Soviet, military and production management officials travelled to Afghanistan. This group put in some good work there. …

On the whole, the situation in Afghanistan is, as you know, difficult. Lately, certain elements of consolidation have been examined, but the process of consolidation is moving slowly. The number of gangs [rebel groups] is not decreasing. The enemy is not laying down its weapons. The negotiations with Pakistan in Geneva are moving slowly and with difficulty. This is why we must do everything to find a mutually acceptable political settlement. In advance, it can already be said that this process will be a lengthy one. There are questions which must be discussed separately. One should only keep in mind that for now we cannot agree with Pakistan on a specific schedule for the withdrawal of our troops from the country. We must exercise caution here. Yes, the situation is stabilizing. It is good that the Afghan army has grown to 140,000. But the main trouble is that the central authorities have not yet reached the countryside: [they] rarely interact with the masses, about one third of the districts is not under the control of the central authority, and one can feel the fragility of the state government.

… evidently we need to take the steps outlined in the recommendations given to you for examination. It will be necessary to hold a meeting with Karmal and a group of leading officials of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan sometime in April. It seems that it would also be expedient for Yu. V. Andropov to meet personally with Babrak Karmal. …

[page three]


ANDROPOV. You remember how arduously and cautiously we decided the question of deploying troops in Afghanistan. L.I. Brezhnev insisted on a roll call vote by the members of the Politburo. The question was examined at the Plenum of the Central Committee.

In deciding the Afghan problem we must proceed from existing realities. What do you want? This is a feudal country where tribes have always been in charge of their territories, and the central authority was far from always able to reach each kishlak [Afghan settlement]. The problem is not in Pakistan’s position. We are fighting against American imperialism which well understands that in this part of international politics it has lost its positions. That is why we cannot back off.

Miracles don’t happen. Sometimes we are angry at the Afghans because they act illogically and work slowly. But let us remember our fight with the basmachi [resistance to Soviet regime, tr]. Why, back then, almost the entire Red Army was concentrated in Central Asia, yet the fight with the basmachi continued up until the mid-1930’s. And so in our relations with Afghanistan there must be both demands and understanding.

As concerns the recommendations of the Commission, they are a little demanding, perhaps, with exact instructions as to what the Afghan side and what we should do.

GROMYKO. Of course we will work to complete the recommendations.

ANDROPOV. Yes, it should be a political document. It must be much more flexible.


1. Notes by translator and editor are bracketed, thus [ ];
2. text written by hand is indicated in italic script;
3. when a handwritten phrase, figure or word has been added
to a previously typed document this is indicated by underlined italic script.
Translation, JC


Posted in 9.2 Afghanistan | Tagged

2 March 1977*, No 74

Memo from ambassador Falin in West Germany (FRG). The anti-Soviet campaign  in the FRG and a possible “solution” to the human rights issue in the USSR (11 pp). [R 2 March 1977, No 74] Excerpts.


Soviet Embassy in German Federal Republic

Top Secret (copy No 2)
2 March 1977
No 74

Concerning the campaign in the FRG
about “human rights”
(Political commentary)

[page one of eleven]

[Typed addition at foot of page]

Studied by our Department

[signed] Nenashev [1]
Deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department


[page two – …]

[page three]

[…] The Social Democrats already feel the danger to themselves of the anti-Communist hysteria. The slogan of the CDU-CSU “freedom instead of socialism” has shown that the SDP will not be last in line when the signal is given for a witch-hunt to begin. … […]

[page four]

[…] At the same time, those I talk to note that the West has appreciated earlier than the East that changes in the international climate will not leave the internal weather in individual States unaffected. The NATO States have paid their own not inconsiderable price for detente, and are far from coping with the difficulties, including those of an ideological character. In the West, however, such difficulties are not so striking because they have learned not to raise or accentuate the threshold of legality in the struggle of ideas in ordinary situations.

Social Democrats tell me that the socialist countries must also take the costs of a restructuring [perestroika] of international relations into account. […]

It must be said that discussions about the way dissidents and non-conformists are treated in the socialist countries are actively held in circles that have a loyal and friendly attitude to the USSR and the CPSU. Often questions are asked that cannot be brushed aside or dismissed with general phrases. […]

[page six]

[…] In particular, the legislative and administrative practice of the FRG demands study. The West German State has flexible and reliable means at its disposal to prevent and halt disagreeable activities, and the emphasis is placed on prosecuting dissidents not for distributing information unfavourable to the regime but for ‘anti-constitutional activity’, public disorder, and so on. The local judicial system is also of interest. It makes its possible, before sentence is passed, to isolate any individual for months and years, and persecute him long before his case has been heard before the court of last instance.

This system functions successfully because it is combined with a well-conceived openness [glasnost] and is enhanced by other quasi-democratic attributes that make it possible to keep the pressure in the boiler at an acceptable level. A considerable part of the work in suppressing the opposition is carried out by the press, the church, schools and bourgeois public organisations under the open and covert supervision of the authorities. […]

[page eight]

USSR Ambassador in the German Federal Republic

[signed] V. Falin

[typed addition at foot of page]

1 – A.A. Gromyko [foreign minister]
2 – CPSU International Department
3 – 3rd European Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4 – Directorate for Foreign ??, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5 – to be filed

To Archive, 15 June 1977

[pages nine to eleven – a request to show Zamyatin at International Department, and a reply that the Department has read the text, April 1977]


[1] This is an example of the thinking that preceded “perestroika”, says Bukovsky. (The Russian copy shows that this top secret document has been studied by someone who underlined certain phrases.)
Valentin Falin was Soviet ambassador in West Germany from 1971 to 1978. He then returned to Moscow. In 1989-1991 he headed the Central Committee’s International Department, see 28 December 1988.
1. Notes and additions by translator and editor are bracketed, thus [ ];
2. Text added by hand is indicated in italic script;
3. when a handwritten phrase, figure or word has been added
to a previously typed document it is indicated by underlined italic script.
Translation, John Crowfoot
Posted in 6. CPSU, non-Communist world